



● ROUTINE

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DIST 26 AUGUST 1975

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1. AUGUST,

BRIEFED

ON THE EFFECTS OF

CHILE OF THE LAST MINUTE CANCELLATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS STUDY GROUP. SAID THAT SINCE THE
CANCELLATION, RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY HAVE DETERIORATED,
CAUSING CHILE'S DEBT RENEGOTIATIONS TO SUFFER ACCORDINGLY.
HE SAID THAT THE CANCELLATION HAD ALSO CAUSED FORMERLY
SYMPATHETIC AMERICAN JOURNALISTS TO TAKE A CRITICAL LINE

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AGAINST CHILE. IN ADDITION, ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN WORKING TO ASSIST CHILE, WERE VERY UPSET WITH THE DECISION AND NOW LESS SYMPATHETIC TO THE CHILEAN CAUSE.

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2. [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT THE MARXIST PROPAGANDA MACHINE, LED BY THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS, WOULD QUICKLY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CHILE'S WEAKENED FOREIGN IMAGE. HE CITED AS THE MOST SERIOUS POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS THE SUSPENSION OR EJECTION OF CHILE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, BOYCOTTS OF CHILEAN PRODUCTS BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND THE LOSS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER COUNTRIES. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE MFA SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION TO IMPROVE CHILE'S IMAGE:

A. INTERNAL: RETURN AUTHORITY TO THE CIVILIAN COURTS FOR THE PROCESSING OF DETAINEES; REVISION OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST LAW; REDUCTION OF THE STATE OF SEIGE TO THE NEXT LOWER CATEGORY. THE MFA SUGGESTED THAT IF APPROVED, THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED DURING CHILEAN INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS ON 18-19 SEPTEMBER.

B. EXTERNAL: INCREASE AND IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA; IMPROVE

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RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) SINCE IT HAS CONSIDERABLE THIRD WORLD INFLUENCE? INVITE INFLUENTIAL U.S. POLITICIANS TO VISIT CHILE FOR FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE? INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHI'S DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING NUMEROUS REASSIGNMENTS. NEARLY 1976.

3. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE MFA SUGGESTED THREE COURSES OF ACTION FOR THE FORTHCOMING SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE FIRST WAS TO INITIATE AN ATTACK AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA. THE SECOND WAS TO REACT IN A DEFENSIVE MANNER ONLY. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] OPTED FOR THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE, WHICH CALLED FOR A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE WITH THE CHILEAN DELEGATION REACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET AND CUBAN INITIATIVES. IF NECESSARY, THIS WOULD INCLUDE AGGRESSIVE RETALIATION AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS USING COMPILED EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMENTS AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHILEANS HAD DECIDED TO LAUNCH AN

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OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE SOVIETS IN THE U.N. WITHOUT
PROVOCATION.)

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